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Defendant and an accomplice robbed, shot, and killed two service
station attendants. Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder in
the first degree and one count of robbery in the first degree. He was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment on each murder count and to 99 years on the
robbery count. The trial court, citing section 546.480, RSMo 1969,2
ordered the sentences to run consecutively. Defendant appealed, alleging
that mandatory imposition of consecutive sentences under the statute de-
prived him of equal protection of the law under both the states and
federal 4 constitutions. He contended that section 546.480 was not applicable
to all convicted multiple offenders, but was applied if, and only if, a de-
fendant was convicted of at least two offenses before he was sentenced
for either offense. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed and remanded
for sentencing only, holding that section 546.480 was a violation of equal
protection.
Courts have developed three standards of review to test legislative
classifications under equal protection. The first and most stringent
standard is the compelling governmental interest test.5 Statutory classifi-
cations which are based either on certain suspect criteria6 or which affect
certain fundamental rights7 are subject to the most rigid scrutiny8 by the
courts and carry a "very heavy burden of justification." 9 These classifica-
tions are upheld only when the state can demonstrate that they are neces-
sary to serve a compelling governmental interest.
The second and least stringent standard of review is the rational
basis test.10 Under this standard a classification is invariably upheld if any
state of facts can be conceived that would sustain it.1" The legislative classi-
1. 524 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
2. The statute provides:
When any person shall be convicted of two or more offenses, before
sentence shall have been pronounced upon him for either offense, the
imprisonment to which he shall be sentenced upon the second or other
subsequent conviction shall commence at the termination of the term
of imprisonment to which he shall be adjudged upon prior conviction.
3. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 2.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
5. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
6. The following have been held to be suspect classifications: race, alienage,
and national ancestry. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
7. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate
travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (criminal appeals).
8. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
9. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
10. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463 (1957).
11. Id. at 463, 464; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
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faction is not upheld only when it is totally arbitrary and has no rational
connection to any legitimate state interest.
The United States Supreme Court has recently retreated from rigid
adherence either to the rational basis test or the compelling governmental
interest test.' 2 The Court has adopted in certain areas a third and inter-
mediate standard of review, which will be referred to as the reasonable
basis test. 13 The fact that a court can find a rational basis for the classi-
fication, based on a hypothetical fact situation, is not sufficient to sustain
the classification under the reasonable basis test. For the classification to be
upheld, there must in fact be a substantial relationship between the legisla-
tive classification and the object of the legislation. 14
When dealing with classifications involving sentencing and punish-
ment, courts have traditionally applied the rational basis test. The de-
termination of a particular sentence or punishment to be imposed upon
a particular class has been sustained so long as there was a rational basis
for any disparity in the sentences.' 5
At common law, all sentences were concurrent unless the sentencing
court expressly made them consecutive. 16 The mandatory imposition of
consecutive sentences under section 546.480 first appeared in Missouri law
in 1835.17 The purpose of the statute was to achieve greater equality in
sentencing by making the sentences run consecutively by force of statute
rather than by the specific order of the court.'8 The statute was attacked
on equal protection grounds for the first time in King v. Swenson.19 The
12. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1972). But see Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (the
Court, although citing Reed, obviously applied the traditional rational basis test).
13. The justices of the Supreme Court have been unable to agree on any
one theory to rationalize their decisions. However, commentators have set forth
two theories. One is the means-oriented theory which involves an inquiry into the
means by which the legislature furthers its goals in view of other available al-
ternatives. The other theory is the sliding scale approach. In this approach, the
intensity of scrutiny depends upon the importance of the interest involved. See
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98.99 (1973)
(Marshall J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970)
(Marshall J.; dissenting); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreward:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
14. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See also
Comment, Equal Protection in Transition: An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 FoRD-
HA L. Rxzv. 605, 616-18 (1973); Gunther, supra note 13, at 21.
15. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Whalen, Resentence
Without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the Laws, 35 MINN. L.
Rav. 239, 245 (1951).
16. See, e.g., Anthony v. Kaiser, 350 Mo. 748, 751, 169 S.W.2d 47, 49 (1943);
State v. Breuer, 304 Mo. 381, 403, 264 S.W. 1, 7 (1924).
. 17. RSMo 1835, at 213. This section was taken from 2 N.Y.R.S. 1829, § 11,
at 700. In recommending that section 11 be included in the 1835 statute the revisors
included a note which explained their reasoning: "New in Form: Generally de-
clared in the sentence, but as it may be omitted, it is deemed useful to provide
for it by law." See State v. Breuer, 304 Mo. 381, 404-06, 264 S.W. 1, 7 (1924).
18. State v. Breuer, 304 Mo. 381, 404-06, 264 S.W. 1, 7 (1924).
19. 423 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
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RECENT CASES
Missouri Supreme Court, applying the rational basis test, found that the
legislative classification did have a rational connection to the state's in-
terest in greater equality in sentencing and thus upheld the statute.20
In Baker the Missouri Supreme Court declared that the purpose of the
statute was to insure that multiple criminal offenders would be punished
more severely than others. The court found that the statute violated equal
protection because the classification was not based on multiple crimes
and criminal propensities, but applied only if a defendant was convicted
of at least two offenses before he was sentenced on either offense.21
It is not clear from the court's opinion in Baker which standard of
review was applied in reaching the decision. Indeed, the court indiscrim-
inately used language and cited cases which indicated all three standards.
First, the court cited Skinner v. Oklahoma,22 a United States Supreme
Court decision which first applied the "compelling governmental interest"
test to classifications involving "fundamental interests." 23 However, the
court also indicated that it had applied the reasonable basis test when it
said: "Equal protection does require that distinctions in classifications
have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made" 24
In addition, the court cited In re Interest of J.D.G.,25 a recent Missouri
Supreme Court decision applying the reasonable basis test to classifications
based on sex. Finally, the court indicated that it was applying the rational
basis test by referring to "the capriciousness of the classification" and "all
semblance of rationality of the classification [disappearing]." 2 6
Because the opinion itself is ambiguous, it is necessary to determine
which test would be consistent with the result. First, the result could not
be reached under the rational basis test, because the statute clearly has a
rational connection to the state's interest in equality in sentencing. For
example, assume that defendant A and defendant B both commit separate
murders on the same day. Before either one is apprehended, they each kill
another person. A and B are both tried and convicted of the first murder
charges. They each file a motion for a new trial which is subsequently
denied. In the meantime both are tried and convicted on the second mur-
der charges. Before section 546.480 was enacted, imposition of consecutive
sentences in these cases would be discretionary with the trial judge. Thus,
the judge could sentence A to serve consecutive terms on the two convictions
which the same judge could sentence B to serve concurrent terms for his
20. Id. at 706.
21. 524 S.W.2d at 129.
22. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
23. The Court stated:
We are dealing here with legislation which involved one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race .... [S]trict scrutiny of the classification
which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential ....
Id. at 541.
24. 524 S.W.2d at 130.
25. 498 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. 1973).
26. 524 S.W.2d at 130.
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two convictions. Even if this judge intended for B to serve consecutive
terms, if he inadvertently omitted such a direction, B would serve only
concurrent terms. This is precisely the kind of unequal treatment that the
statute was designed to eliminate by limiting the discretion of judges. Be-
cause a state of facts that sustains the statute is conceivable and these facts
could have existed when the statute was passed, the statute should have
been upheld under the rational basis test.27
Furthermore, in applying the rational basis test, courts have recognized
that legislative reform may proceed one step at a time.28 The legislature, in
selecting the particular statutory classification, had the discretion to remedy
one phase of the problem while neglecting others. Thus section 546.480 can
be upheld, even though it does not achieve total equality, as the Missouri
legislature's first step toward attaining total equality in sentencing and
punishment.
Although the Baker court could have concluded that section 546.480
is unconstitutional by applying the "compelling governmental interest" test,
it is unlikely that this was in fact the standard applied. First, the only indi-
cation that the court applied this standard of review was the citation to
Skinner. Second, application of the "compelling interest" test to a classi-
fication involving sentencing and punishment would have gone far be-
yond prior case law29 and would have implicitly made sentencing a
"fundamental interest." Such a radical change in the standard of review
would surely have been accompanied by a more explicit statement of the
standard of review being applied and the reasons for so great a change.
Because the decision cannot be explained under either the compelling
governmental interest test or the rational basis test, the court must have,
without acknowledging it, applied the intermediate reasonable basis test.
If so,, the court has raised the standard of review in sentencing and punish-
ment cases in Missouri from a rational basis to a reasonable basis. Although
Baker involved the question of consecutive versus concurrent sentences in
a narrow fact situation, its rationale should be equally applicable to other
sentencing and punishment statutes. For example, statutory classifications
under the new Missouri Capital Murder Act3 0 or under a statute provid-
ing for a minimum sentence for the use of a gun in the commission of a
crime3l should be subject to closer scrutiny. Missouri courts, under the
new reasonable basis test, may now reevaluate sentencing statutes to de-
termine whether they comply with this higher standard.
TIMOTHY K. KELLETr
27. See notes 10, 11 and accompanying text supra.
28. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).
29, See notes 15-20 and accompanying text supra.
30. § 559.009, RSMo 1975 Supp.
31. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 12, § 18B (1974).
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